Competitive wages in a match with ordered contracts
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Competitive wages in a match with ordered contracts

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Published by National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, Mass .
Written in English

Subjects:

  • National Resident Matching Program (U.S.),
  • Residents (Medicine) -- Salaries, etc. -- United States,
  • Wages -- Econometric models

Book details:

Edition Notes

StatementMuriel Niederle.
SeriesNBER working paper series -- no. 12334., Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 12334.
ContributionsNational Bureau of Economic Research.
The Physical Object
Pagination21 p. ;
Number of Pages21
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL17630243M
OCLC/WorldCa70235881

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Competitive Wages in a Match with Ordered Contracts by Muriel Niederle. Published in vol issue 5, pages of American Economic Review, December , Abstract: Following the recently dismissed antitrust lawsuit against the National . Competitive Wages in a Match with Ordered Contracts Muriel Niederle. NBER Working Paper No. Issued in June NBER Program(s):Labor Studies A recent antitrust lawsuit against the National Residency Matching Program renewed interest in understanding the effects of a centralized match on wages of medical by: I model a feature of the NRMP, ordered contracts, that allows firms to set several contracts while determining the order in which they try to fill them, which has different properties than standard models with multiple contracts. Furthermore, the low wages of Bulow and Levin are no longer an equilibrium, but competitive wages are. I model a feature of the NRMP, ordered contracts, that allows firms to set several contracts while determining the order in which they try to fill them, which has different properties than standard models with multiple contracts. Furthermore, the low wages of Bulow and Levin are no longer an equilibrium, but competitive wages are. (JEL D86, J

BibTeX @MISC{Goldberg_competitivewages, author = {Andrew V. Goldberg and Jason D. Hartline and Anna R. Karlin and Michael Saks and Andrew Wright}, title = {Competitive wages in a match with ordered contracts}, year = {}}. BibTeX @MISC{Niederle06competitivewages, author = {Muriel Niederle}, title = {Competitive wages in a match with ordered contracts}, year = {}}. Competitive wages in a match with ordered contracts () Cached. Download Links [] [] {Competitive wages in a match with ordered contracts}, year = {}} Share. OpenURL. Abstract. In response to a recently dismissed antitrust lawsuit against the National Residency Matching. Keyphrases. national. Competitive Compensation Contracts Tore Ellingseny Eirik Gaard Kristiansenz Septem Abstract We develop a model of equilibrium compensation contracts in a competitive market for heterogeneous workers. The eventual value of a match depends on the fortunes of the employer’s industry, and turnover could be e ciency-enhancing. Ap-.

Know your worth. Inform your career path by finding your customized salary. Find out what you should earn with a customized salary estimate and negotiate pay with confidence. Match, particularly because work by Jeremy Bulow and Jonathan Levin () lends some theoretical support for the position that the Match may compress and reduce doctors wages relative to a perfectly competitive stan-dard. The practical possibility of such an exten-sion depends on many details, including, importantly, the form in which doctors.   In order for agencies to take continuous advantage of the benefits of competition after contract award, FASA provides that agencies may make multiple awards of task and delivery order contracts for the same or similar supplies or services (and . b. Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act 5 c. Copeland Act 5 d. Fair Labor Standards Act 5 Davis-Bacon Act Regulations 5 Construction Contract Provisions 6 a. Labor Standards Clauses 6 b. Davis-Bacon Act Wage Determinations 6 Responsibility of the Prime Contractor 6.